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We examine patient socio-economic status, the strength of the patient-doctor 
relationship and local area competition as determinants of the quality and price 
of GP services. We exploit a large-sample patient data set in Australia and its 
linkage to administrative databases. The sample contains over 260,000 patients 
and over 12,600 GPs, observed between 2005 and 2010. Controlling for GP 
fixed effects and patient health, we find no strong evidence that quality differs 
by patient age, gender, country of origin, health concession card status and 
income, but quality is increased by stronger patient-doctor relationship. Using a 
competition measure that is defined at the individual GP level and not restricted 
to a local market, we find that competition lowers quality. Price is increasing in 






1. Introduction  
Providing high quality healthcare has always been a core goal of any health system. Primary care 
by general practitioners (GPs) is an essential part, yet we know very little about it. Do GPs 
provide different quality care to different patients? Can we increase quality by promoting 
competition? In a review paper of studies of the market for GP services, Gaynor and Town (2011) 
describe this lack of empirical evidence as “frustrating” [p.101]. The biggest constraint has been 
data availability: a consumer survey provides only patient information whilst a GP survey does 
not have detailed information about each patient. In this paper, we have the opportunity 
contribute to this literature by observing the linkage between patients and GP services in 
Australia. Patient data is derived from a large-sample general population survey, so it is not 
restricted to patients of selected GP practices. For these patients, GP services data are 
comprehensive, derived from Australian government administrative records. We focus on the role 
of patient socio-economic status, the intensity of the patient-doctor relationship and the level of 
competition in determining quality. In addition, as Australian GPs can set their own fees, we also 
examine the variation in price associated with these factors.   
A significant proportion of the existing literature on the quality of GP services consists of 
program evaluation studies of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs. These programs pay GPs for 
achieving quality target(s). The UK Quality and Outcome Framework (QOF), enacted nation-
wide since 2004, is the largest P4P scheme in scale and in scope (Roland, 2004; Roland et al 
2006). The QOF includes a wide range of indicators of patient care, including clinical (80 
indicators), organisational (43 indicators), patient experience (4 indicators) and additional 
services (8 indicators). In other countries, including Australia, P4Ps are smaller in scope, 
applying to specific services and/or only implemented in certain GP groups or selected provinces 
and states. Some P4Ps have been found successful in increasing quality (Dudley et al. 1908; 
Petersen et al., 2006; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2011; Scott et al., 2009; McElduff et al., 
2004), but others are found to have a transitory impact (Lester et al., 2010) or have produced 
incentives for GPs to “game” the programs by manipulating the target measures to increase their 
incomes (Norton, 1992; Doran et al., 2008; Gravelle et al, 2010). Some P4Ps have also been 
found to result in cream-skimming patients to more easily achieve the targets (Shen, 2003; Roski 
et al., 2003).  
The mixed results of P4P program evaluations, suggest there may be other factors influencing the 
provision of quality care. Competition could be one of them. There is evidence that competition 
can increase quality of hospital services (e.g., Propper et al 2008). Gaynor and Town (2011) 
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review the effect of competition in physician services. However of the fifteen studies of 
competition reviewed, none had quality as an outcome. Recently Gravelle et al (2013) have 
studied the effect of competition on quality using Australian GP longitudinal survey data, 
Medicine in Australia: Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL). They find that competition 
has no effect on the average length of consultation, their measure of quality. While their sample 
coverage is nation-wide, the number of GPs in the survey is less than 4,000, of which only half 
are included in the analysis so sample selection may be a concern. In addition, perhaps due to a 
high attrition rate, they do not use the panel aspect of the survey to exploit time variation. The 
quality measure is also self-reported, so biases due to measurement error are likely e.g., GPs with 
more competition may be more likely to overstate service quality.  
Quality may be provided differently to different patients, but because of a lack of appropriate 
data, the role of patient characteristics has largely been overlooked in this literature. A few 
studies from the US have found discrimination against low-income and uninsured patients in 
hospital care (Lopez et al., 2010; Doyle 2005). There is also evidence of racial discrimination in 
the US, with ethnic minorities, who tend to have lower incomes, receiving lower quality care 
(Miranda and Cooper, 2004; Betancourt et al., 2003). This may partly be explained by the 
privately-driven nature of the US health care market. Whether patient socio-demographic 
characteristics affect treatment quality in the setting of universal health care systems, such as 
Australia, is an empirical question, which we investigate in this study. It may be possible for 
patient socio-economic status to affect quality through improved communication with doctors, in 
turn leading to better health outcomes (Willems et al., 2005).  
To study price discrimination, we take advantage of the institutional settings of primary care in 
Australia, where GPs are paid on a fee-for-service basis and are free to set fees at any level 
(unbounded above) beyond a regulated floor price. Although there are incentives for GPs to 
charge at the floor price (which is termed ‘bulk-billing’), the free price-setting ability induces 
heterogeneity in fees across GPs, as well as across patients of individual GPs, who may bulk-bill 
only some of their patients. Patients have free access to any GP. There is no restriction in terms of 
insurance group or other membership, enrolment on a GP patient list, or residential location. 
Without recourse to administrative data it is difficult to observe how much a GP charges each 
patient.  
Our data is derived from a large survey in New South Wales (NSW), the largest state of 
Australia. It contains over 260,000 respondents and is linked to claims databases of all out-of-
hospital doctor consultations, including GP services, used by each respondent during 2005-2010. 
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In addition to the subsidy paid by the government (Medicare), the claims data contains the actual 
fee paid by the patient for each service item provided. We construct our quality indicators from 
these claims data: three measures are based on GPs’ management of chronic diseases and a 
further measure is based on consultation length. Based on over 12,600 GPs in our sample over the 
study period, many of whom are observed for multiple years; our full sample contains 43,638 GP-
year observations. Using GP fixed effects models which account for individual GP heterogeneity, 
we find that competition does not increase quality. In fact, in one of our models in which the 
competition measure is based on the GP rather than a geographically defined local area, we find 
that competition lowers quality. We find no strong quality differential by patient characteristics, 
except that quality increases with the strength of the patient-doctor relationship. In relation to 
price, we find that the average price is lowered by competition but the size of the competition 
effect is small, about 1-3% of the mean price for a large (two standard deviations) increase in the 
competition measures. The average price is increasing in patient income and decreasing in the 
patient-doctor relationship.  
 
2. Australian Primary Care Market 
Australia has a mixed public and private health system. The public health system, Medicare, 
heavily subsidises a wide range of medical services and prescription drugs and provides free 
public inpatient treatment. Private health insurance does not cover out-of-hospital services, with a 
few exceptions for non-subsidised drugs and ancillary services such as dental and allied health.  
Australian general practitioners have a gatekeeper role, providing primary care and controlling 
access to specialist services and diagnostics. The latest Primary Health Care Research and 
Information Service (PHCRIS) census in 2010-2011, reported that there were 7,035 practices and 
24,720 practising GPs around the country, or one GP per 1,118 population. During our study 
period, GP services were spatially coordinated by Divisions of General Practice (DGP), 
administrative entities whose boundaries were devised taking account of population 
demographics, patient flows and health service use1. While DGP neither regulated a GP within its 
boundaries nor restricted a patient’s choice of GP, the divisions developed recruitment and 
retention strategies and gave a sense of geographic proximity in terms of the characteristics of the 
local GP market. According to the latest PHCRIS enumeration, there were 111 DGP across the 
                                                          
1
 The DGP was a community-level organisation that allowed local residents to have a say in the provision of 
their needs. DGPs were diverse in terms of size, but they had common goals of delivering support and services 
to GPs and strengthening primary care for their local communities. In 2012, DGP were replaced by Medicare 
Locals. http://www.medicalobserver.com.au/news/medicare-locals-boundaries-mapped  
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country, with the smallest serving just over 15,000 population with 17 GPs and the largest DGP 
serving over 650,000 population with 853 GPs. There were 34 DGP in NSW, with an average 
population size of 207,000, and an average of 220 GPs (200 full-time equivalents). 
GPs operate privately on a fee-for-service basis with subsidies for specified services defined by 
the Medicare Australia Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS). The MBS provides a description of 
each eligible service (item), its schedule fee and the subsidy level (Medicare rebate) that provides 
a floor price for the item. There are about 50 GP attendance items, which are consultations that 
vary by time (normal hours or after hours), length (specified in 20 min blocks), and location 
(consultation room, home visit, hospital or residential aged care facility or institution). By far the 
most common is item number 23 for a level B consultation at a consultation room outside 
hospital setting during normal hours. The MBS description of consultations reflects both length 
and content. Level A consultations are mostly used for straightforward tasks such as 
immunisation. Level B consultations involve “taking a selective history, examination of the 
patient with implementation of a management plan in relation to one or more problems, or a 
professional attendance of less than 20 minutes duration involving components of a higher level 
service.” Level C consultations involve a higher level service, “taking a detailed history, an 
examination of multiple systems, arranging any necessary investigations and implementing a 
management plan in relation to one or more problems, and lasting at least 20 minutes.” The 
highest level is a level D consultation, which is more comprehensive, for more complex problems 
lasting at least 40 minutes. In 2010-2011, the distribution for these four consultation levels was 
2.8%, 86%, 10% and 0.8% (Medicare Australia, 2011). Reflecting the higher levels of 
complexity, the associated schedule fees are also increasing from $16 for a level A consultation, 
to $34.90 for level B, $67.65 for level C, and $99.55 for level D consultations. The schedule fee 
is indexed to wage inflation on an annual basis.  
For all GP attendance items, the Medicare rebate is 100% of the schedule fee. If a GP charges 
above this level, patients pay the gap as an out-of-pocket cost. While there is no rule governing an 
upper bound to the charge, Medicare pays financial incentives to GPs who charge specific classes 
of patients the floor price (bulk bill). In 2009/2010, Medicare paid an extra $5.70 per service to 
GPs who bulk billed minors (aged under 16) and health concession card holders. GPs in rural or 
remote areas and in some metropolitan areas, deemed to have GP shortages, receive an extra 
$8.55 per bulk-billed service. Over 80% of GP services provided outside hospitals are bulk billed 
(Australian Government Department of Human Services, 2012, chapter 7). Bulk billing rates are 
higher in areas of greater GP density reflecting higher local competition (Jones and Savage, 2004; 
Johar, 2012).  
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One of the major concerns with a fee-for-service payment system is that it may compromise 
quality of care, for instance by encouraging a high volume of short consultations. There is a 
growing body of evidence suggesting that GPs with longer consultation times provide better 
clinical care and also achieve greater communication with patients, increased levels of patient 
satisfaction and lower prescribing rates (Goedhuys and Rethans, 2001; Freeman et al., 2002; 
Howie et al., 1991; Jaye and Tilyard, 2002; Béjean et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2001; Wilson et 
al., 2002). In the extreme case of ‘six minute medicine’, a GP charging at the rebate level can 
generate 75% more revenue from ten level B consultations in an hour than from three 20 minute 
level C consultations. Britt et al., (2004) using self-reported survey data, find that Australian GPs 
report spending an average of 11 minutes on level B consultations and 27 minutes on level C 
consultations. Using these figures, we can illustrate the existing financial disincentives to provide 
long consultations. In a 7 hour day, a GP who charges at the rebate levels can derive 29% more 
revenue from providing level B consultations than level C consultations. GPs whose market 
power would allow them to charge high fees are likely to benefit more from adopting this high 
volume strategy. 
In an attempt to promote high quality care, the government introduced the Practice Incentive 
Program (PIP) in July 1998. The PIP offers 13 financial incentives to practices which achieve 
target measures in selected services (cervical cancer screening, diabetes and asthma), improving 
capacity in terms of computerisation, adhering to prescribing guidelines, providing after-hours 
care and services to indigenous, rural or older patients and involvement in teaching. The PIP for 
cervical cancer screening and diabetes, makes 3 payments: (i) a sign-on payment, a one-off 
payment for setting up a register and reminder system; (ii) outcome payments which reward 
higher screening rates or completions of the annual cycle of care for patients with diabetes; and 
(iii) service incentive payments, an annual payment for every newly screened woman or new 
diabetes patient. PIP asthma incentives provide only sign-on and service incentive payments. The 
PIP operates at the practice level, and over 70% of GP practices participate.  
A further programme aimed at improving patient outcomes is chronic disease management 
(CDM). By 2020 it is expected that 80% of Australia’s burden of disease will be attributed to 
chronic conditions and that this proportion will grow as the population ages. CDM is a 
coordinated approach to minimise the impact of chronic illness and prevent or delay its 
progression, thereby improving the quality of life and health outcomes of those diagnosed with 
one or more chronic diseases. Unlike PIP, CDM is not a pay-for-performance scheme. CDM 
requires a comprehensive health assessment, the use of multidisciplinary shared care plans, the 
application of evidence-based protocols in managing patient’s health and care needs, and the 
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promotion of active self-management where possible. CDM is a potentially time consuming task 
for GPs. For example, in providing a Management Plan, a GP, must: (a) assess patient’s health 
care needs, problems and conditions; (b) develop agreed management goals with the patient; (c) 
identify actions to be taken by the patient; (d) identify treatment and services that the patient is 
likely to need and make arrangements for these services; and (e) document all of these steps in 
the GP management plan document. A new management plan may be required around once every 
two years, with regular reviews (recommended six monthly) of the patient’s progress against the 
plan.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The data are derived from three sources: (i) the NSW 45 and Up Study which surveyed each 
respondent once during 2006-2010 (45 and Up Study Collaborators, 2007); (ii) Medicare 
Australia’s Medicare Benefit Schedule data for 2005-2010; and (iii) DGP data from PHCRIS. 
The 45 and Up survey is a large sample study, involving 266,804 respondents. This is 10% of the 
45+ population in NSW and the sample demographic characteristics align with the 45+ 
population characteristics from the national health survey (Johar et al., 2012). For our sample, we 
exclude respondents who volunteered to be part of the survey and those who do not have a valid 
age. The final sample is 265,468 respondents. This survey data is linked at the individual level to 
Medicare data, covering all subsidised medical services used by the survey respondents.2 The 
GPs in our study are those with either FRACGP/CRRM or VRGP/ACCRM accreditation, who 
provide services to respondents of the 45 and Up Study at any time during the period 2005-2010. 
A unique encrypted GP identifier indicates his/her pool of patients. There is no practice-level 
identifier.  
These GPs may provide multiple services to a single respondent and may treat more than one 
respondent. They also may be located outside NSW if they provide services to the 45 and Up 
survey respondents. On average, a survey respondent visits two different GPs per year and 
between four and five unique GPs over the 5 year period. The GP coverage of our 45+ sample is 
very high, with over 8,000 GPs in the sample each year; this is close to the number of GPs in 
                                                          
2
 The 45 and Up survey is collected and managed by the Sax Institute which also performs the linkage to the 
Medicare data (for details see http://www.saxinstitute.org.au/). The linked, de-identified data is accessed with 
ethics approval. Participants were randomly selected from the Medicare database for this population age group. 
The survey was done in stages, but the bulk of it (about 80%) was collected in 2008. This variation in survey 
year is due to sampling process rather than the choice of respondents.     
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NSW reported by PHCRIS.3 The unit of observation is GP-year; we aggregate patient-year data 
to GP-year level data. Over the five year period of our data, we have 12,652 accredited GPs 
resulting in 43,638 GP-year observations.   
We derive all of our variables for the analysis based on the definition of a patient pool. A patient 
in this study is a respondent of the 45 and Up Study. Each year a GP has about 52 patients. We 
acknowledge that this definition of a patient pool misses patients under the age of 45, so price and 
quality may be measured with error if, for example, GPs tend to charge older patients lower fees 
or provide extra care to them. Measurement error in outcome variables however does not create 
bias if it is uncorrelated with covariates. In addition, the GP fixed effect approach provides some 
control over the variation in the full patient list.  
3.1. Quality 
As quality indicators, we consider several measures, all derived from the administrative data. The 
first measures are CDM activities: the number of CDM consultations per 100 total consultations 
and the GP’s per patient revenue from CDM. In 2009, the rebate for the first CDM consultation 
by an individual GP was about $134 and a CDM review attracted $67. Although technically GPs 
can charge anything above the CDM rebate, we find that the majority charge at the floor price 
(the mark-up is less than $1 on average). The second measure is based on PIP. PIP items (cervical 
screening, asthma cycle and diabetes cycle) are conducted during consultations and attract the 
same rebate as non-PIP consultations. PIP payments are paid separately at the practice-level. 
Because we do not have practice identifiers, we cannot use revenue as an intensity measure of 
PIP activities. Hence we use only the number of PIP consultations per 100 total consultations. 
The final measure that we use is the share of long consultations out of total consultations. The 
long consultations are given by level C and level D consultations (i.e., over 20 minutes).  
3.2. Price 
The measure of price is the average fee charged by a GP for Medicare item 23 consultations, 
measured in constant A$2009. In order to have a single price, we select a specific item, rather 
than a type of service (e.g., standard consultations, which have a different price if performed after 
hours or not in a GP consulting room). We use Item 23 because all GPs provide it and it is the 
most frequent service provided by GPs. The average fee is computed including all item 23 
consultations, not just item 23 consultations where fees are above the Medicare rebate; GPs who 
                                                          
3
 In 2010, the PHCRIS estimated there are 7,822 practising GPs in NSW. Our GP number is larger because our 
sample may include GPs in other states used by the 45 and Up survey respondents during the study period. The 
data can be downloaded from www.phcris.org.au/products/asd/keycharacteristic/KeyDGPstatistics.xls 
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bulk-bill many of their patients will have a lower average price. There are over 4 million item 23 
consultations in our data during the entire study period. An average GP provides about 107 item 
23 consultations in a year to our patient sample. As this price is obtained from administrative data 
rather than survey data, we avoid the likely measurement errors in self-reported fee data, which 
are likely to be correlated with observed determinants of price, such as competition.   
3.3. Competition 
We consider three measures of competition, each with strengths and limitations. The first 
measure is the full-time GP to thousand population ratio at the DGP level. We obtain this 
information from the PHCRIS data. Physician density is commonly used, with the expectation 
that the higher the ratio the more intense is the competition level in the area. There is, however, 
concern that a DGP may be too wide to define a local market. Our second measure therefore 
attempts to address the issue of locality by narrowing the market to a postcode-level. There are 
over 600 residential postcodes in NSW with an average population of about 10,800 residents, as 
opposed to the 34 DGPs’ average of some 200,000 residents. Our sample covers all 34 DGPs and 
over 520 postcodes in each year (549 postcodes over all 5 years). PHRICS does not collect 
information at the postcode-level. However, given the wide coverage of our data, we can utilise 
internal variation.  
Using the GPs in the sample, for each year we compute the number of GPs in a given postcode. 
This number may include part-time GPs because we have no information on GP hours. 
Using postcode-year observations, the average number of GPs per postcode in our data is 20 with 
a median of 13. As a reference, the total number of full-time GPs in NSW in the PHRICS data 
implies an average of approximately 16 GPs per postcode. Hence, despite being restricted to GPs 
used by respondents, our data covers a large number of GPs per postcode, suggesting high 
accuracy of this measure of competition. 
Any area-based measure of competition may be correlated with unobserved area determinants of 
price and quality. To the extent that a GP’s location preference is pre-determined however, these 
biases are removed by GP fixed effects. Our third measure attempts to break this notion of 
locality and uses information about other GPs used by patients. Gravelle et al (2013) propose a 
new measure of competition at the GP practice-level based on distance to other practices (not 
limited to GPs in the survey). In our case, because we do not know the location of GPs who are 
not used by sample respondents, we cannot use this measure. Alternatively, for each patient, we 
find the list of GPs he/she visits in each year; this includes any GP, not only those that practice in 
the same location as the patient’s residence. Based on this information and the identification of a 
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patient pool for each GP in a given year, we count the number of unique, other GPs used by the 
GP’s patients to capture the extent of his/her potential competitors. Most patients (95%) visit no 
more than two different GPs in a year. For comprehensiveness, we construct our measure of 
number of potential competitors by considering patients using up to three different GPs. This 
does not mean that we restrict the number of a GP’s potential competitors to three. Each GP can 
have any number of competitors, depending on whether or not his/her patients see many GPs. For 
example, a GP with four patients will have 12 competitors if each patient sees 3 distinct other 
GPs, but he/she will have no competitors if all of them see only him/her. Although a patient’s 
choice set of GPs is not observed by a GP, the patient may convey that he/she is also seeing other 
GPs and this may induce the GP to lower his/her price and increase quality; the GP may also 
notice that the number of patient appointments is declining. This measure is in the spirit of the 
competition measure proposed by Gravelle et al (2013), in that both measures define competition 
at the individual GP level.  
3.4. Patient profile 
From the survey, we obtain patient socio-demographic and income status information. The health 
information in the 45 and Up survey data provides information on a patient’s long-term health 
conditions. The information includes diagnosed chronic illnesses, consumption of over-the-
counter medicines, and medical treatments received for various conditions. We use all of these 
variables to construct a summary measure of a patient’s health, which is a count of having been 
diagnosed or treated for the following conditions: any type of cancer, high blood pressure, heart 
disease, blood diseases, high cholesterol, thyroid disorders, digestion problems, bone diseases, 
asthma or hay fever, stroke, Parkinson’s disease, depression and diabetes. The maximum score is 
12 for someone with all of the above conditions. This health score seeks to capture health status 
more accurately than would the condition that initiated a single GP consultation. In addition, to 
allow for a different impact on price and quality indicators of specific conditions, we construct 
separate variables for each of cancer, hypertension, heart, high cholesterol, asthma and diabetes.  
We also obtain information about a GP’s relationship with patients. The literature has suggested 
that an ongoing relationship or familiarity with GP can facilitate higher quality care, but we 
cannot find any evidence of the effect on price of the patient-doctor relationship. On the one 
hand, a closer relationship may attract a discount or shorter consultation because the GP is 
familiar with the patient’s medical history, but on the other hand loyalty may also allow the GP to 
charge a premium.  
3.5. Descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis 
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all variables overall (GP-years) as well as indicating 
the extent of variation by providing the standard deviations between GPs and within each GP 
over time. The average price overall (in constant $A2009) is about $37, about $5 above the floor 
price. The between variation (between different GPs) is much larger than the within variation 
(within a GP over time). On average there are 4 CDM consultations and 0.3 PIP consultations per 
100 consultations. PIP consultations are infrequent because PIP participation is not universal, and 
PIP only covers cervical screening, asthma and diabetes. The average per patient revenue from 
CDM is about $13 and the average long consultation rate is 16%. As with price, the between 
variation in quality is larger than the within variation, but there is still considerable within 
variation. The competition measures indicate that the average GP per thousand people in a DGP 
is 0.94, the average number of GPs in a postcode is 49, and the average number of GP specific 
competitors is 26. The within variation in these competition measures is quite small, which 
should not be surprising since GP supply is slow changing.  
[Table 1 here] 
Because the analysis is conducted at the GP level, patient characteristics have to be aggregated. 
We therefore compute for each GP: the share of patients in various age and income groups, the 
share of male patients, the share of health concession card patients, the share of patients who 
were foreign born, the average health score index and the share of patients with specific chronic 
diseases. To create a measure of the strength of the patient-GP relationship, for each GP, we first 
identify patients who only visited that GP during the entire year. Then among these patients, we 
calculate the proportion who visited that GP only once (‘One-off’). The idea here is to capture 
minimal patient-GP interaction, but removing correlation with competition (i.e., patients visiting 
a number of different GPs). However there will be GPs with all of their patients also seeing other 
GPs in which case the ratio One-off is not defined. We create an indicator variable for these GPs 
(‘One-off missing’). 
As expected, patient characteristics exhibit smaller within GP variation, because respondents tend 
to go to the same GP. However, the extent of the within variation is not small, despite the 
restriction that the patient pool consists only of survey respondents. Patients of an average GP in 
the sample tend to have 2-3 chronic conditions; 3-4 in 10 patients have high blood pressure, high 
cholesterol or cancer (including skin cancer and melanoma); 1-2 in 10 patients have asthma, 
diabetes or heart problems and 4 in 10 patients are male. Approximately 20% GPs have no 
patients who visit them exclusively during the year. Of the remaining 80%, the mean One-off 
ratio is about 0.25. 
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To model the impact of market and patient characteristics on price and quality of care, we 
estimate GP fixed effect models. In the administrative patient claims databases, we do not have 
detailed information about the GP, such as is available in GP survey data. However, most GP 
background characteristics such as gender, origin, medical qualifications and professional ethics 
are fixed, so a GP fixed effect model will control for the confounding effects of these time-
invariant factors that might affect price and quality. Location and practice-level variables such as 
whether the GP practices as a solo practitioner or in a group practice are also relatively slowly 
changing, at least over the short-term of our data, so their effects are also likely to be absorbed by 
the GP fixed effect. As Table 1 indicates, there is significant within GP variation in the data, 
which aids credibility of the GP fixed effect model. While the fixed effect models are preferred, 
we also provide pooled OLS estimates as a comparison to highlight the bias in failing to 
adequately account for fixed effects. Because the impact of time-invariant factors can be 
identified in OLS, we include the SEIFA index of socio-economic advantage and dummy 
variables for remoteness based on the ARIA index, both constructed by the Australian Bureau 
Statistics. In all models we also include year dummy variables to pick up macroeconomic trends.    
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports the sources of price variation. All three competition measures have negative 
coefficients in the fixed effect models, confirming that average price is lowered by competition. 
All else constant, a two standard deviation increase in the competition measures leads to a $0.55-
$1.05 reduction in price on average, or about 1-3% of the mean price. This impact is not very 
large, suggesting that GP’s pricing behaviour, at least for the most demanded service, is quite 
insensitive to even large changes in competition.  
[Table 2 here] 
In relation to the extent of patient-based discrimination, we find that price is decreasing in patient 
general health, age, concession card and foreign-born status, and increasing in patient income. 
The income gradient is quite large given that income information is not typically supplied to GPs, 
although GPs may infer it from indicators such as address and occupation. This result may reflect 
increasing willingness to pay by income. The marginal effect of the share of the highest income 
patients is a $5 increase in fee, on average, relative to that of the share of the lowest income 
patients. This result is consistent with Johar (2012) which shows that there is a $6 fee gap for 
item 23 between the highest and lowest income patients of an average GP. There is no evidence 
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of discrimination by the patient gender. Familiarity with a GP attracts a discount, as we find that 
price is increasing in One-off. The GP fixed effect models have good explanatory power, 
indicated by the high R-squared of nearly 0.9. The bulk of the variation (about 80%) is due to GP 
heterogeneity, but patient characteristics play a non-trivial role.   
In OLS, we can identify the effects of remoteness and the area’s socio-economic advantage 
index. We find that price is lower in major cities and higher in areas of greater socio-economic 
advantage. In the fixed effect models, these effects are absorbed by the fixed effects. For time-
varying variables, the OLS and area fixed effect models show several marked differences. OLS 
exaggerates the effect of competition, suggesting that omitted factors that negatively affect price 
(e.g. city areas) are positively correlated with competition. In other words, GPs who do not mind 
competition are also those who are prepared to receive a lower average price. The OLS model 
indicates significant discrimination against male patients. Even after controlling for the area 
socio-economic advantage level, individual patient income still shows a very strong gradient, 
especially for the highest income group. OLS overestimates the patient income effect, suggesting 
a positive correlation between the GP’s latent financial motive and patient income. The effects of 
the proportions of foreign-born and one-off patient-GP interaction are also exaggerated. OLS 
indicates that GPs whose patients also see other GPs have higher prices, but this can be explained 
by GP fixed effects (e.g., the characteristics of patient pool). These differences highlight biased 
causal inference when relying on OLS estimates of price determinants. 
We investigate whether competition has a bigger impact on the bulk-billing rate than on the price 
level. Table 3 reports the results using bulk-billing rate as the dependent variable instead of price. 
Slightly over 30% of cases involve 100% bulk-billing, with the remainder incurring some out-of-
pocket charge. The mean bulk-billing rate is 71%. We find that the impact of competition on the 
bulk-billing rate is larger than the impact on price, but it is still quite small. Fixed effect Model 1 
predicts 0.06 percentage points (8% of the mean bulk-billing rate) increase in bulk-billing rate for 
a two standard deviation increase in the GP to population ratio while fixed effect Model 3 
predicts 0.03 percentage points increase in the bulk-billing rate for a two standard deviation 
increase in the number of local competitors. Fixed effect Model 2 predicts smaller impacts and 
not significantly different from zero. Other results are consistent with Table 2. For instance, we 
find no significant correlation between the bulk-billing rate and gender, and the bulk-billing rate 
is negatively correlated with patient income.  
[Table 3 here] 
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Tables 4 and 5 report the results for models which use the CDM measures as the quality 
indicator. Models 1 and 2 use the GP to population ratio and the number of GPs in a postcode as 
measures of competition. The fixed effect models indicate that competition has no significant 
impact on CDM activities. However in Model 3, using the number of competitors for a GP’s 
patients as the competition measure, which is not confined to the definition of a local GP market, 
we find that competition lowers CDM activities. This negative competition effect is unexpected. 
Previous results based on OLS or within-area models indicate that competition and quality are 
positively correlated. Our results are the first to be based on within-GP variation, which removes 
many time-invariant confounding factors driving the positive correlation between competition 
and quality across GPs. A two standard deviation increase in the number of competitors is 
associated with 2.2 fewer CDM consultation per 100 consultations (55% of the mean) and $3 
lower per patient CDM revenue (24% of the mean). Since the average size of a patient pool for 
GPs in the sample is about 50, a two standard deviation change, which is also 50, is equivalent to 
each patient seeing another GP.  
[Table 4 here] 
[Table 5 here] 
The GP fixed effect models indicate that CDM activities are also increasing in diabetes patients, 
but there is no evidence of a positive impact for other chronic diseases. One explanation for this 
is that, relative to other chronic conditions, there is more knowledge and agreement on the 
protocol for diabetes diagnosis and care, which may include CDM. Diabetes is also closely linked 
to diet and lifestyle choices, and CDM can integrate consultations with a nutritionist. Diabetes 
also tends to be co-morbid with other conditions such as high cholesterol and hypertension. CDM 
activities are decreasing in patient income and one-off patient-GP interactions, suggesting a 
positive effect of patient-doctor relationship on quality.  
Table 6 reports the results for PIP. Like CDM, competition has no impact on quality according to 
the area-based competition measures (FE1 and FE2), however GPs with more competitors 
provide lower quality. PIP activities are increasing in the shares of diabetes and female patients 
Diabetes and cervical screening are two of the three components of PIP. The correlation with 
diabetes is particularly strong, perhaps reflecting the wide knowledge and guidelines available 
about diagnosing and managing diabetes and GPs’ more aggressive attitude towards tackling 
diabetes. Asthma, the other component of PIP, is not significant, perhaps due to the low 
likelihood of a new asthma diagnosis in our older population sample and/or self-management is 
enough for the stage of their asthmatic condition. Finally, PIP is decreasing in one-off patient-GP 
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interactions. OLS indicates that PIP activities are lower in socio-economically advantaged areas 
which may reflect relatively lower rates of diabetes and asthma in these areas.  
[Table 6 here] 
Table 7 reports the results for our last measure of quality, the share of long consultations. Again, 
the competition effect depends on the measure of competition used. Quality is increasing in area-
based competition measures but decreasing in the number of competitors to individual GPs. In 
any case, however, we find that the size of the competition effect is rather trivial. For a large (two 
standard deviations) increase, we find that the effect is about 11-13% of the mean rate for the 
area-based measures and 3% for the number of competitors. The proportion of long consultations 
is decreasing in the proportion of high cholesterol patients, which may capture alternative 
treatment options such as drugs (rather than consultation). It is also decreasing in the one-off 
patient-GP interaction. OLS results support the common conjecture that higher income patients 
tend to receive longer consultations. The fixed effect models however suggest that this positive 
correlation is not causal.  
[Table 7 here] 
In summary, we find that competition has a negative impact on price, but the size of the impact is 
trivial. The competition impact on the bulk-billing rate is larger, but still considerably small. Price 
is increasing in patient income. The effect of patient income on quality is significant only in some 
models but the direction of the impact is always negative. On the other hand, we find a robust 
positive impact of patient-doctor relationship on quality. Area-based measures of competition 
have no impact on quality, but we find negative competition effects on all of our four quality 
indicators due to an increase in the number of individual GP’s competitors.  
Gravelle et al (2013) suggests that the competition effect may be enhanced by the absence of 
price competition, because then, competing on quality is the only way to attract patients. In our 
data, we can use the information on patient characteristics that are highly correlated with bulk 
billing. Bulk-billed patients are more likely to be health concession card holders and are less 
likely to be high income earners, so we create interaction terms between competition and patient 
concession status and high income. A significant coefficient on the interaction term with health 
card in the same direction as the competition effect would support this view. On the other hand, 
the competition effect should be smaller with a higher share of high income patients. Table 8 
reports the results based on fixed effect model FE3. Separate models were estimated for each 
interaction term. For CDM, the results are as expected; the coefficients of the interaction terms 
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with income have the opposite sign to the competition effect while the coefficient of the 
interaction term with health card has the same sign. This suggests that the adverse impact of 
competition on quality may be particularly felt by low income patients and concession card 
holders (e.g., old patients, low income and rural patients). The results for long consultation also 
support this prediction. In contrast, for PIP, we do not find the expected results, perhaps due to 
varying prevalence of asthma, diabetes and cervical cancer, the three conditions covered by PIP, 
by patient socioeconomic status.  
[Table 8 here] 
So far we have assumed that survey information is stable across years. This may not be true, for 
example, patients may acquire a new illness or change their income over time. As a robustness 
check, we exclude medical services that occur more than twelve months prior to the survey date, 
and re-estimate all models. We retain 92% of the sample and the results are robust: strong 
positive impact of income in the price equation and consistent positive impact of diabetes in all 
quality equations. As another robustness check, we impose a sample restriction to include only 
GPs who appear at least four times in the five year period to get better identification of the fixed 
effect. We retain over 75% of the sample and again we find that the main results are robust.      
 
6. Conclusion  
Exploiting the opportunity to observe the behaviour of thousands of GPs and the characteristics 
of their patients, we study the determinants of quality and price of GP services. We find some 
evidence that competition may lower quality, rather than increase it. Moreover, we find some 
evidence that the adverse impact of competition is more likely to be experienced by low income 
patients and concession card holders. This finding is derived from a measure of competition that 
is defined at the individual GP level and is not restricted to the definition of a local GP market. In 
terms of patient characteristics, we find only one strong determinant of quality, the patient-doctor 
relationship, suggesting that there is an additional degree of care that is exerted when a GP treats 
a patient who he/she has previously treated. With regard to the determinants of price, although 
competition lowers price, only a large change in competition will induce a meaningful change in 
price. A big driver of price variation is patient income, although there is little evidence that 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Overall Between Within Fixed 
effect 
  Mean s.d. s.d. s.d. Mean 
Outcome           
Price $37.38 $8.80 $8.41 $3.96 $37.68 
Bulk-billing rate 0.711 0.336 0.337 0.116 0.695 
CDM /100 consultation 3.904 10.118 8.961 5.996 3.506 
CDM $/patient $12.88 $26.56 $24.03 $14.58 $11.10 
PIP /100 consultations 0.306 1.429 1.567 0.770 0.281 
% long consultation 0.164 0.175 0.165 0.074 0.154 
Competition      
FT GP/1000 pop 0.943 0.161 0.156 0.034 0.928 
# competitors (/10) 2.575 2.473 2.233 0.894 2.061 
# GPs in a postcode (/10) 4.880 4.505 4.482 0.317 4.934 
GP’s Patients      
Illness score 2.307 0.817 0.918 0.416 2.340 
Asthma  0.157 0.155 0.177 0.084 0.160 
Diabetes  0.108 0.134 0.154 0.069 0.109 
Heart  0.155 0.156 0.177 0.084 0.157 
High cholesterol  0.290 0.194 0.221 0.102 0.291 
Hypertensive  0.433 0.213 0.241 0.112 0.438 
Cancer  0.350 0.211 0.237 0.108 0.358 
Male  0.427 0.225 0.248 0.108 0.425 
Aged <55  0.259 0.192 0.208 0.106 0.251 
Aged <55-64  0.331 0.202 0.226 0.116 0.337 
Aged <65-74  0.227 0.188 0.212 0.104 0.235 
Aged <75+  0.178 0.175 0.189 0.089 0.171 
Foreign-born  0.306 0.249 0.260 0.098 0.293 
Income <$20k  0.218 0.196 0.221 0.095 0.225 
Income $20k-<$40k  0.169 0.165 0.189 0.087 0.174 
Income $40k-<$70k 0.167 0.150 0.172 0.082 0.165 
Income $70k+ 0.222 0.195 0.209 0.091 0.214 
Income missing 0.224 0.172 0.198 0.091 0.222 
Health concession card 0.313 0.224 0.251 0.108 0.324 
One-off  0.207 0.279 0.225 0.198 0.188 
One-off missing 0.218 0.413 0.421 0.223 0.342 
Note: ‘Overall mean’ ignores the panel nature of the data. ‘Fixed effect mean’ is GP average over time with 
only one observation per GP.  One-off missing is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a GP did not have 
any patient who visited just him/her in a given year (which determines the denominator of One-off), and 0 
otherwise. One-off missing is always 0 when One-off is zero but One-off can be zero because patients who 




Table 2: The determinants of average price 
  OLS1   FE1   OLS2   FE2   OLS3   FE3   
  b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
FT GP/1000 pop -5.593*** (0.313) -1.708** (0.695)         
# GPs postcode (/10)     0.148*** (0.009) -0.116* (0.062)     
# competitors (/10)         -0.449*** (0.022) -0.136*** (0.024) 
Illness score -0.198* (0.111) -0.439*** (0.137) -0.241** (0.112) -0.441*** (0.137) -0.246** (0.111) -0.440*** (0.137) 
Asthma  0.173 (0.320) 0.598 (0.368) 0.217 (0.320) 0.602 (0.367) 0.305 (0.319) 0.611* (0.368) 
Diabetes  -0.652** (0.332) -0.174 (0.402) -0.610* (0.333) -0.168 (0.402) -0.733** (0.330) -0.178 (0.402) 
Heart  -0.012 (0.327) -0.195 (0.392) 0.104 (0.328) -0.193 (0.392) 0.090 (0.327) -0.199 (0.392) 
High cholesterol  -0.392 (0.275) 0.609* (0.326) -0.462* (0.276) 0.613* (0.326) -0.473* (0.275) 0.610* (0.326) 
Hypertensive  -0.582** (0.261) 0.436 (0.301) -0.432 (0.262) 0.441 (0.300) -0.456* (0.261) 0.428 (0.300) 
Cancer  1.593*** (0.254) 0.753** (0.293) 1.606*** (0.254) 0.760*** (0.293) 1.916*** (0.254) 0.771*** (0.293) 
Male  -2.579*** (0.204) -0.384 (0.271) -2.635*** (0.205) -0.384 (0.271) -2.525*** (0.205) -0.403 (0.271) 
Aged <55  -1.498*** (0.312) 2.745*** (0.409) -1.802*** (0.312) 2.755*** (0.409) -1.479*** (0.311) 2.740*** (0.409) 
Aged <55-64  1.340*** (0.273) 3.153*** (0.355) 1.219*** (0.274) 3.178*** (0.355) 1.266*** (0.273) 3.150*** (0.355) 
Aged <65-74  0.230 (0.280) 1.347*** (0.343) 0.211 (0.281) 1.359*** (0.343) 0.241 (0.280) 1.349*** (0.343) 
Foreign-born  -3.029*** (0.178) -0.742*** (0.274) -3.525*** (0.176) -0.742*** (0.273) -3.465*** (0.174) -0.763*** (0.273) 
Income $20k-<$40k  2.386*** (0.283) 0.597* (0.362) 2.456*** (0.285) 0.584 (0.362) 2.629*** (0.282) 0.613* (0.361) 
Income $40k-<$70k 4.960*** (0.355) 2.331*** (0.439) 4.994*** (0.358) 2.315*** (0.438) 5.367*** (0.354) 2.363*** (0.439) 
Income $70k+ 13.738*** (0.357) 5.224*** (0.435) 13.651**
* 
(0.357) 5.217*** (0.435) 13.871**
* 
(0.356) 5.264*** (0.436) 
Income missing 3.036*** (0.274) 1.806*** (0.358) 3.063*** (0.275) 1.794*** (0.358) 3.173*** (0.273) 1.819*** (0.358) 
Health concession 
card 
-3.831*** (0.224) -2.245*** (0.286) -3.887*** (0.225) -2.238*** (0.286) -3.913*** (0.224) -2.245*** (0.286) 
One-off  0.635*** (0.145) 0.303*** (0.115) 0.683*** (0.145) 0.303*** (0.115) 1.041*** (0.144) 0.326*** (0.115) 
One-off missing 1.330*** (0.106) 0.075 (0.110) 1.350*** (0.106) 0.074 (0.110) 0.451*** (0.116) 0.029 (0.110) 
Inner region 2.155*** (0.102)   2.492*** (0.099)   2.940*** (0.094)   
Outer region 2.214*** (0.144)   3.659*** (0.123)   3.225*** (0.124)   
Remote 1.144*** (0.270)   2.371*** (0.268)   1.769*** (0.269)   
SEIFA 9.156*** (0.626)   11.844**
* 
(0.602)   11.831**
* 
(0.599)   











R-squared 0.317   0.890   0.316   0.890   0.324   0.890   
Note: All models include dummy variables for year. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: The determinants of bulk-billing rate  
  OLS1   FE1   OLS2   FE2   OLS3   FE3   
  b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
FT GP/1000 pop 0.326*** (0.011) 0.174*** (0.027)         
# GPs postcode (/10)     -0.004*** (0.000) 0.001 (0.002)     
# competitors (/10)         0.022*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 
Illness score 0.011** (0.005) 0.014** (0.006) 0.013*** (0.005) 0.015** (0.006) 0.013*** (0.005) 0.015** (0.006) 
Asthma  0.008 (0.013) -0.007 (0.015) 0.006 (0.013) -0.008 (0.015) 0.002 (0.013) -0.008 (0.015) 
Diabetes  0.026* (0.015) 0.030* (0.017) 0.025* (0.015) 0.030* (0.017) 0.030** (0.015) 0.030* (0.017) 
Heart  0.010 (0.014) 0.020 (0.017) 0.005 (0.014) 0.02 (0.017) 0.005 (0.014) 0.021 (0.017) 
High cholesterol  0.008 (0.012) -0.027* (0.014) 0.013 (0.012) -0.028** (0.014) 0.013 (0.012) -0.028** (0.014) 
Hypertensive  -0.001 (0.011) -0.026** (0.013) -0.009 (0.011) -0.026** (0.012) -0.008 (0.011) -0.026** (0.012) 
Cancer  -0.067*** (0.011) -0.033*** (0.013) -0.069*** (0.011) -0.034*** (0.013) -0.083*** (0.011) -0.035*** (0.013) 
Male  0.117*** (0.008) 0.005 (0.011) 0.122*** (0.008) 0.005 (0.011) 0.115*** (0.008) 0.006 (0.011) 
Aged <55  0.109*** (0.013) -0.122*** (0.017) 0.125*** (0.013) -0.122*** (0.017) 0.110*** (0.013) -0.122*** (0.017) 
Aged <55-64  -0.019 (0.012) -0.138*** (0.015) -0.013 (0.012) -0.140*** (0.015) -0.014 (0.012) -0.139*** (0.015) 
Aged <65-74  0.022* (0.012) -0.052*** (0.015) 0.022* (0.012) -0.053*** (0.015) 0.021* (0.012) -0.052*** (0.015) 
Foreign-born  0.171*** (0.008) 0.032*** (0.011) 0.198*** (0.007) 0.032*** (0.011) 0.196*** (0.007) 0.033*** (0.011) 
Income $20k-<$40k  -0.115*** (0.013) -0.025 (0.016) -0.121*** (0.013) -0.024 (0.016) -0.128*** (0.013) -0.025 (0.016) 
Income $40k-<$70k -0.212*** (0.015) -0.091*** (0.018) -0.219*** (0.015) -0.090*** (0.018) -0.234*** (0.015) -0.092*** (0.018) 
Income $70k+ -0.516*** (0.014) -0.182*** (0.018) -0.518*** (0.015) -0.182*** (0.018) -0.524*** (0.014) -0.184*** (0.018) 
Income missing -0.118*** (0.012) -0.068*** (0.015) -0.119*** (0.012) -0.067*** (0.015) -0.125*** (0.012) -0.068*** (0.015) 
Health concession 
card 
0.169*** (0.010) 0.100*** (0.012) 0.172*** (0.010) 0.100*** (0.012) 0.174*** (0.010) 0.100*** (0.012) 
One-off  -0.008 (0.006) -0.007 (0.004) -0.012** (0.006) -0.007 (0.004) -0.029*** (0.006) -0.008* (0.004) 
One-off missing -0.026*** (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) -0.028*** (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) 0.017*** (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 
Inner region -0.097*** (0.004)   -0.132*** (0.004)   -0.144*** (0.004)   
Outer region -0.099*** (0.006)   -0.182*** (0.005)   -0.161*** (0.005)   
Remote -0.032*** (0.011)   -0.100*** (0.011)   -0.073*** (0.011)   
SEIFA -0.261*** (0.023)   -0.402*** (0.022)   -0.412*** (0.022)   
Constant  0.691*** (0.033) 0.642*** (0.032) 1.154*** (0.029) 0.792*** (0.024) 1.097*** (0.028) 0.782*** (0.021) 
R-squared 0.261  0.891  0.249  0.890  0.268  0.891  




Table 4: The determinants of quality using CDM/100 consultations 
  OLS1   FE1   OLS2   FE2   OLS3   FE3   
  b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
FT GP/1000 pop 3.117*** (0.339) 1.391 (1.216)         
# GPs postcode (/10)     -0.027*** (0.010) -0.103 (0.098)     
# competitors (/10)         0.107*** (0.018) -0.437*** (0.064) 
Illness score 0.487*** (0.148) 0.125 (0.181) 0.505*** (0.148) 0.125 (0.181) 0.507*** (0.148) 0.125 (0.181) 
Asthma  -0.14 (0.418) -0.155 (0.456) -0.162 (0.418) -0.160 (0.456) -0.183 (0.418) -0.132 (0.456) 
Diabetes  3.018*** (0.583) 2.726*** (0.707) 3.015*** (0.583) 2.724*** (0.707) 3.041*** (0.582) 2.697*** (0.706) 
Heart  -1.603*** (0.419) -0.701 (0.544) -1.656*** (0.418) -0.693 (0.545) -1.654*** (0.418) -0.699 (0.545) 
High cholesterol  0.912*** (0.323) 0.640 (0.439) 0.969*** (0.323) 0.632 (0.439) 0.969*** (0.323) 0.619 (0.439) 
Hypertensive  0.282 (0.293) -0.248 (0.402) 0.214 (0.292) -0.245 (0.403) 0.218 (0.292) -0.279 (0.402) 
Cancer  -0.195 (0.296) -0.021 (0.380) -0.217 (0.296) -0.028 (0.380) -0.288 (0.296) 0.007 (0.380) 
Male  -0.526** (0.226) -0.487 (0.358) -0.467** (0.226) -0.488 (0.358) -0.497** (0.226) -0.553 (0.358) 
Aged <55  0.944*** (0.355) -0.372 (0.565) 1.085*** (0.355) -0.376 (0.565) 1.012*** (0.355) -0.421 (0.566) 
Aged <55-64  0.345 (0.341) -0.217 (0.497) 0.392 (0.340) -0.226 (0.497) 0.384 (0.340) -0.301 (0.497) 
Aged <65-74  -0.181 (0.361) 0.115 (0.484) -0.183 (0.361) 0.115 (0.484) -0.188 (0.360) 0.098 (0.484) 
Foreign-born  -0.644*** (0.216) -0.632* (0.346) -0.392* (0.214) -0.626* (0.346) -0.402* (0.213) -0.686** (0.347) 
Income $20k-<$40k  -0.606 (0.398) -0.629 (0.560) -0.671* (0.397) -0.634 (0.559) -0.708* (0.397) -0.563 (0.561) 
Income $40k-<$70k -1.271*** (0.354) -1.464*** (0.536) -1.359*** (0.354) -1.463*** (0.535) -1.438*** (0.352) -1.327** (0.538) 
Income $70k+ -2.138*** (0.365) -1.372** (0.558) -2.182*** (0.365) -1.370** (0.558) -2.222*** (0.364) -1.225** (0.560) 
Income missing -0.653* (0.368) -0.68 (0.527) -0.662* (0.367) -0.679 (0.527) -0.689* (0.367) -0.61 (0.527) 
Health concession 
card 
0.018 (0.271) 0.372 (0.383) 0.042 (0.271) 0.365 (0.383) 0.049 (0.271) 0.340 (0.383) 
One-off  -2.223*** (0.215) -0.532** (0.242) -2.257*** (0.215) -0.530** (0.242) -2.341*** (0.219) -0.453* (0.245) 
One-off missing -2.738*** (0.162) 0.286 (0.293) -2.752*** (0.162) 0.288 (0.293) -2.538*** (0.168) 0.145 (0.282) 
Inner region 0.703*** (0.144)   0.319** (0.141)   0.240* (0.136)   
Outer region 0.445** (0.190)   -0.338* (0.174)   -0.238 (0.174)   
Remote 0.722 (0.513)   0.077 (0.514)   0.215 (0.514)   
SEIFA 0.595 (0.684)   -0.696 (0.671)   -0.722 (0.669)   
Constant  -0.59 (0.996) 2.278* (1.256) 3.747*** (0.878) 4.050*** (0.792) 3.426*** (0.869) 4.765*** (0.642) 
R-squared 0.028  0.655  0.026  0.655  0.027  0.657  
Note: All models include dummy variables for year. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: The determinants of quality using CDM revenue per patient 
 
  OLS1   FE1   OLS2   FE2   OLS3   FE3   
  b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
FT GP/1000 pop 9.286*** (0.945) 3.929 (3.313)         
# GPs postcode 
(/10) 
    -0.052* (0.028) 0.315 (0.289)     
# competitors (/10)         -0.014 (0.040) -0.614*** (0.076) 
Illness score 2.901*** (0.573) 1.533** (0.705) 2.952*** (0.573) 1.540** (0.705) 2.945*** (0.573) 1.535** (0.705) 
Asthma  -2.212 (1.417) -1.023 (1.780) -2.276 (1.414) -1.032 (1.779) -2.270 (1.415) -0.996 (1.779) 
Diabetes  10.432*** (2.102) 7.816*** (2.568) 10.433*** (2.101) 7.801*** (2.568) 10.451*** (2.102) 7.770*** (2.567) 
Heart  -5.546*** (1.753) -1.838 (2.148) -5.696*** (1.752) -1.843 (2.149) -5.684*** (1.753) -1.831 (2.148) 
High cholesterol  1.772 (1.301) 0.666 (1.523) 1.951 (1.303) 0.656 (1.522) 1.970 (1.303) 0.629 (1.522) 
Hypertensive  0.244 (1.100) -1.554 (1.402) 0.050 (1.097) -1.567 (1.403) 0.067 (1.098) -1.599 (1.402) 
Cancer  -3.417*** (1.151) -3.087** (1.384) -3.489*** (1.150) -3.101** (1.383) -3.494*** (1.152) -3.054** (1.383) 
Male  -0.729 (0.841) -0.683 (1.235) -0.539 (0.839) -0.683 (1.235) -0.506 (0.840) -0.776 (1.235) 
Aged <55  -1.689 (1.440) -1.836 (1.959) -1.286 (1.439) -1.858 (1.958) -1.306 (1.438) -1.913 (1.958) 
Aged <55-64  -2.675* (1.404) -1.495 (1.848) -2.546* (1.404) -1.556 (1.848) -2.566* (1.403) -1.634 (1.848) 
Aged <65-74  -3.441** (1.503) -1.064 (1.774) -3.454** (1.503) -1.092 (1.775) -3.466** (1.503) -1.094 (1.774) 
Foreign-born  0.229 (0.797) 0.631 (1.174) 0.966 (0.791) 0.63 (1.174) 0.942 (0.790) 0.560 (1.174) 
Income $20k-<$40k  -5.394*** (1.499) -5.692*** (2.058) -5.601*** (1.500) -5.660*** (2.057) -5.622*** (1.499) -5.595*** (2.057) 
Income $40k-<$70k -7.507*** (1.471) -8.955*** (2.230) -7.805*** (1.471) -8.914*** (2.229) -7.865*** (1.468) -8.753*** (2.230) 
Income $70k+ -10.045*** (1.379) -9.390*** (2.180) -10.227*** (1.381) -9.372*** (2.179) -10.317*** (1.377) -9.177*** (2.181) 
Income missing -3.783** (1.523) -4.231** (1.968) -3.808** (1.522) -4.199** (1.968) -3.798** (1.522) -4.124** (1.968) 
Health concession 
card 
0.131 (1.133) 0.138 (1.466) 0.200 (1.132) 0.122 (1.466) 0.192 (1.133) 0.085 (1.466) 
One-off  -16.498*** (0.370) -5.541*** (0.426) -16.604*** (0.372) -5.542*** (0.426) -16.600*** (0.366) -5.429*** (0.425) 
One-off missing -12.786*** (0.369) -4.218*** (0.548) -12.830*** (0.370) -4.214*** (0.548) -12.862*** (0.390) -4.414*** (0.552) 
Inner region 0.091 (0.367)   -1.160*** (0.348)   -1.350*** (0.333)   
Outer region -0.361 (0.538)   -2.684*** (0.498)   -2.675*** (0.498)   
Remote -1.213 (0.903)   -3.114*** (0.887)   -3.093*** (0.889)   
SEIFA -4.942*** (1.888)   -8.676*** (1.895)   -8.460*** (1.891)   
Constant  12.312*** (2.920) 10.679*** (4.003) 25.028*** (2.777) 12.657*** (2.969) 24.681*** (2.775) 15.958*** (2.681) 
R-squared 0.092  0.721  0.090  0.721  0.090  0.721  
Note: All models include dummy variables for year. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: The determinants of quality using PIP/100 consultations 
 
  OLS1   FE1   OLS2   FE2   OLS3   FE3   
  b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. B s.e. 
FT GP/1000 pop -0.247*** (0.046) -0.071 (0.163)         
# GPs postcode 
(/10) 
    -0.003* (0.001) 0.012 (0.014)     
# competitors (/10)         -0.012*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.004) 
Illness score -0.059** (0.024) -0.022 (0.032) -0.060** (0.024) -0.022 (0.032) -0.060** (0.024) -0.023 (0.032) 
Asthma  0.113 (0.087) -0.020 (0.084) 0.115 (0.086) -0.020 (0.084) 0.117 (0.087) -0.019 (0.084) 
Diabetes  1.499*** (0.171) 0.812*** (0.161) 1.497*** (0.171) 0.812*** (0.161) 1.496*** (0.170) 0.810*** (0.161) 
Heart  0.062 (0.086) -0.100 (0.106) 0.065 (0.086) -0.101 (0.106) 0.066 (0.086) -0.100 (0.106) 
High cholesterol  0.239*** (0.066) 0.207** (0.098) 0.233*** (0.067) 0.207** (0.098) 0.235*** (0.067) 0.206** (0.098) 
Hypertensive  0.088* (0.052) -0.008 (0.068) 0.092* (0.052) -0.009 (0.068) 0.093* (0.052) -0.010 (0.068) 
Cancer  0.034 (0.050) 0.104 (0.080) 0.037 (0.050) 0.105 (0.080) 0.043 (0.050) 0.107 (0.080) 
Male  -0.263*** (0.041) -0.115* (0.067) -0.270*** (0.041) -0.115* (0.067) -0.264*** (0.041) -0.119* (0.067) 
Aged <55  0.060 (0.062) 0.104 (0.084) 0.051 (0.062) 0.104 (0.084) 0.056 (0.062) 0.102 (0.084) 
Aged <55-64  0.050 (0.061) 0.095 (0.086) 0.048 (0.061) 0.095 (0.086) 0.047 (0.061) 0.092 (0.086) 
Aged <65-74  -0.022 (0.058) -0.040 (0.078) -0.021 (0.058) -0.040 (0.078) -0.022 (0.058) -0.040 (0.078) 
Foreign-born  -0.099** (0.040) 0.074 (0.079) -0.117*** (0.040) 0.073 (0.079) -0.118*** (0.040) 0.071 (0.079) 
Income $20k-<$40k  0.221*** (0.085) -0.016 (0.092) 0.229*** (0.085) -0.016 (0.092) 0.230*** (0.085) -0.013 (0.092) 
Income $40k-<$70k 0.079 (0.081) 0.073 (0.107) 0.093 (0.081) 0.073 (0.107) 0.094 (0.081) 0.080 (0.107) 
Income $70k+ 0.133* (0.073) -0.060 (0.101) 0.145** (0.073) -0.060 (0.101) 0.139* (0.073) -0.052 (0.101) 
Income missing 0.066 (0.071) 0.047 (0.098) 0.066 (0.071) 0.047 (0.098) 0.070 (0.071) 0.050 (0.098) 
Health concession 
card 
-0.049 (0.049) 0.015 (0.075) -0.050 (0.049) 0.015 (0.075) -0.052 (0.049) 0.013 (0.075) 
One-off  -0.173*** (0.035) -0.036 (0.033) -0.169*** (0.035) -0.037 (0.033) -0.161*** (0.035) -0.032 (0.033) 
One-off missing -0.248*** (0.023) -0.051 (0.033) -0.247*** (0.023) -0.051 (0.033) -0.270*** (0.025) -0.060* (0.033) 
Inner region 0.039** (0.017)   0.088*** (0.019)   0.076*** (0.018)   
Outer region 0.017 (0.025)   0.077*** (0.025)   0.069*** (0.026)   
Remote -0.083* (0.045)   -0.035 (0.046)   -0.046 (0.046)   
SEIFA -0.426*** (0.092)   -0.343*** (0.092)   -0.318*** (0.092)   
Constant  0.880*** (0.145) 0.232 (0.187) 0.571*** (0.130) 0.106 (0.126) 0.565*** (0.129) 0.240** (0.112) 
R-squared 0.026  0.712  0.026  0.712  0.026  0.712  
Note: All models include dummy variables for year. Standard errors are White’s robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: The determinants of quality using percentage of long consultations 
  OLS1   FE1   OLS2   FE2   OLS3   FE3   
  b s.e. B s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. B s.e. 
FT GP/1000 pop 0.063*** (0.007) 0.067*** (0.018)         
# GPs postcode 
(/10) 
    -0.001*** (0.000) 0.002 (0.002)     
# competitors (/10)         -0.007*** (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) 
Illness score 0.021*** (0.002) 0.008** (0.003) 0.022*** (0.002) 0.008** (0.003) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.008** (0.003) 
Asthma  -0.011* (0.007) 0.013 (0.009) -0.011* (0.007) 0.013 (0.009) -0.01 (0.007) 0.013 (0.009) 
Diabetes  0.002 (0.008) 0.016 (0.010) 0.002 (0.008) 0.015 (0.010) 0.001 (0.008) 0.015 (0.010) 
Heart  -0.001 (0.007) 0.011 (0.009) -0.002 (0.007) 0.011 (0.009) -0.002 (0.007) 0.011 (0.009) 
High cholesterol  -0.028*** (0.006) -0.032*** (0.008) -0.027*** (0.006) -0.032*** (0.008) -0.026*** (0.006) -0.032*** (0.008) 
Hypertensive  -0.044*** (0.005) -0.003 (0.007) -0.046*** (0.005) -0.003 (0.007) -0.045*** (0.006) -0.003 (0.007) 
Cancer  0.000 (0.005) -0.003 (0.007) 0.000 (0.005) -0.004 (0.007) 0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.007) 
Male  -0.084*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.006) -0.083*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.006) -0.080*** (0.004) -0.003 (0.006) 
Aged <55  0.030*** (0.007) 0.008 (0.010) 0.033*** (0.007) 0.008 (0.010) 0.036*** (0.007) 0.008 (0.010) 
Aged <55-64  0.002 (0.006) -0.011 (0.008) 0.003 (0.006) -0.012 (0.008) 0.003 (0.006) -0.012 (0.008) 
Aged <65-74  -0.004 (0.007) -0.005 (0.009) -0.004 (0.007) -0.005 (0.009) -0.004 (0.007) -0.005 (0.009) 
Foreign-born  -0.009** (0.004) 0.010 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) 0.010 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) 0.010 (0.006) 
Income $20k-<$40k  0.011 (0.007) -0.003 (0.009) 0.009 (0.007) -0.003 (0.009) 0.011 (0.007) -0.003 (0.009) 
Income $40k-<$70k 0.018** (0.007) -0.013 (0.010) 0.016** (0.007) -0.012 (0.010) 0.018** (0.007) -0.012 (0.010) 
Income $70k+ 0.020*** (0.007) -0.018* (0.010) 0.019*** (0.007) -0.018* (0.010) 0.018** (0.007) -0.018* (0.010) 
Income missing 0.000 (0.006) -0.003 (0.009) 0.000 (0.006) -0.002 (0.009) 0.002 (0.006) -0.002 (0.009) 
Health concession 
card 
-0.001 (0.005) 0.011 (0.007) -0.001 (0.005) 0.010 (0.007) -0.002 (0.005) 0.010 (0.007) 
One-off  -0.005 (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) 
One-off missing -0.034*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.034*** (0.002) -0.008** (0.003) -0.048*** (0.003) -0.008*** (0.003) 
Inner region 0.006** (0.002)   -0.002 (0.002)   -0.005** (0.002)   
Outer region 0.020*** (0.003)   0.004 (0.003)   -0.001 (0.003)   
Remote 0.026*** (0.006)   0.013** (0.006)   0.006 (0.006)   
SEIFA 0.416*** (0.013)   0.390*** (0.013)   0.401*** (0.013)   
Constant  -0.295*** (0.019) 0.117*** (0.020) -0.207*** (0.016) 0.169*** (0.014) -0.203*** (0.016) 0.180*** (0.012) 




Table 8: Competition and patient economic status 
  CDM/100 CDM rev/patient PIP Long consult 
  b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. 
Models with interaction terms         
Model 1: # competitors ('10) -0.491*** (0.094) -0.824*** (0.135) -0.020*** (0.007) -0.002*** (0.001) 
Model 1: # competitors ('10) x $70k+ 0.215 (0.299) 0.842* (0.453) -0.021 (0.022) 0.007** (0.003) 
Model 2: # competitors ('10) -0.297*** (0.100) -0.354** (0.159) -0.029*** (0.007) 0.001 (0.001) 
Model 2: # competitors ('10) x health card -0.503* (0.292) -0.934* (0.504) 0.013 (0.022) -0.007*** (0.003) 
Note: Models 1 and 2 are FE3 estimated separately with addition of interaction term. *, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
